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The Constitution, Civil Liberties
and John Marshall Harlan
By FLORIAN BARTosi *
I. A Neglected Constitutional Statesman
When John Marshall Harlan died in 1911 after almost thirty-
four years of faithful service as an associate justice of the Supreme
Court, it was generally assumed that he was assured of a niche in
our judicial hall of fame.' An editor of Bench and Bar prophesied:
The judicial history of this country will not fail to accord to
him a most honorable, exalted and enduring fame;2
while another author wrote:
[H]is dissents will always be referred to with a respect due
to their learning, their manifest patriotism and their careful
exposition of the law.3
This jurist, whose length of service upon our highest court has
been exceeded by only the great Chief Justice in whose honor
he was named and Mr. Justice Field,4 had been a diligent and
prodigious worker, and the hallmarks of his judicial accomplish-
ments were independence of thought and tenacity of conviction.
The author of over 1100 opinions, he spoke for the Court 708
times and produced 100 concurring opinions, and he merited for
* A.B., 1948, Pontifical College Josephinum; B.C.L., 1956, College of William
and Mary; LL.M., 1957, Yale University. Assistant Professor of Law, Villanova
University. Admitted to bar, Virginia.
I For example, see Proceedings on the Death of Mr. Justice Harlan, 222 U.S.
v (1911); "John, Marshall Harlan," 56 Ohio Law Bull. 399 (1911); "John
Marshall Harlan,' 17 Va. L. Reg. 497 (1911); and Brown, "The Dissenting
Opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan," 46 Amer. L. Rev. 321 (1912).
2 "John Marshall Harlan," 27 Bench and Bar 1, 4 (1911).3 Brown, "The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan, 46 Amer. L. Rev.
321, 352 (1912).
4Harlan served for a period of thirty-three years, ten months and twenty-five
days; Marshall, thirty-four years, five months and five days; and Field, thirty-
four years, six months and ten days.
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himself the title "The Great Dissenter"' by differing with the
majority of his brother justices in 380 cases and expressing his
dissent in 316 opinions.' There can be no doubt that Justice
Harlan played a major role in developing the function of the dis-
senting opinion in our judicial system. Together with Justice Mil-
ler,7 he forms a bridge from "the first dissenter," Justice William
Johnson,' and that champion of the states' rights cause on the
Taney Court, Justice Peter V. Daniel,9 to the glorious days of
"Holmes and Brandeis dissenting." In the words of Edward S.
Corwin, Harlan's dissenting opinions kept "the spark of life going
in the corpus juris of our constitutional law during a very damp
season."'
0
There was a second prophecy made upon the death of Mr.
Justice Harlan:
Some of them [his dissents] will doubtless become the basis
of future legislation, and perhaps for a reversal by the Court
itself.11
Our legal history records an astonishing fulfillment of this prop-
hecy: on no less that eight vital issues Justice Harlan's dissents
have been vindicated by constitutional amendments, legislative
action or Court reversals. The sixteenth amendment of 1913 was
necessitated by the narrow view on income taxation taken by the
Court in the Pollack case,'" while the twenty-first amendment of
5"John Marshall Harlan," 27 Bench and Bar 1, 4 (1911); "John Marshall
Harlan," 17 Va. L. Reg. 497, 503 (1911); "John Marshall Harlan, Remarks of
W. L. Granbery," 56 Ohio Law Bull. 402, 404 (1911); and "John Marshall
Harlan," 44 Chicago Legal News 85 (1911). In his remarks at the Sixth Circuit's
memorial session upon Justice Harlan's death, W. L. Granbery recounted: "Last
winter I was in the courtroom and heard a young lawyer cite a case and say that
the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan. Mr. Justice Lurton, with that
delightful merry twinkle in his eye, which we all know so well, leaned forward
and said: 'Was that one of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions?' The young
lawyer replied: 'No, your honor, that was one of the few times the court agreed
with him. Then feeling that some apology was needed, he added: 'But I got the
supreme court of Tennessee to adopt one of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions
as the law of that state.' Mr. Justice Harlan, with a broad smile said: 'That was
after Judge Lurton left that court, wasn't it?"' 56 Ohio Law Bull. 402, 404 (1911).6 Three of his colleagues joined Harlan in dissent 107 times.
7 See Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court 386 (1939).
8 See Morgan, Justice William Johnson, the First Dissenter (19,54).
9 See Brown, "The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Daniel," 21 Amer. L.
Rev. 869 (1887) and Brown, "The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan,"
46 Amer. L. Rev. 321, 328-325 (1912).
10 Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 89 (1941).
11 Brown, "The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan,' 46 Amer. L. Rev.
821, 852 (1912).
12 Pollack v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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1933 in making the traffic in liquor a matter of state regulation
undid Leisy v. Hardin (1889). 13 The Court's 1897 opinion in
Robertson v. Baldwin'4 was corrected by the Federal Seamen's
Act of 1915.1' In the field of civil rights, Morgan v. Virginia
(1946)10 overruled the segregated railroad accommodation cases
of 189017 and in 1954 the Court discarded the PlessyVI "separate-
but-equal" shibboleth that had been relied upon since 1896 to
cast an aura of legality about racial injustice.:9 The unrealistic
1899 E. C. Knight0 concept of inter-state commerce that had
hamstrung the nation's lawmakers for almost forty years was
rectified by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937).21
With respect to state minimum hour 22 and federal interstate rail-
way injuries legislation,23 the Court, with an assist from Congress,
was more quick to amend its ways.
That the second prophecy made upon Justice Harlan's death
has been abundantly flfilled makes the nonfulfillment of the first
even more difficult to understand. For despite the remarkable
vindication of his dissenting opinions, the biographers have
ignored him,24 most compilers of casebooks have slighted him,25
and Mr. Justice Frankfurter has "respectfully" dismissed him as
"an eccentric exception."' And only one work has been devoted
13135 U.S. 100 (1889).
14165 U.S. 275 (1897).
15Act of March 4, 1915, c. 153, 38 Stat. 1164 (codified in various sections
of 22, 33, 46 U.S.C.).10 328 U.S. 372 (1946).
17 Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900).
18 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).10 fBrown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharp, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).2 0 United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
21301 U.S. 1 (1937).
22 Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and Bunting v. Oregon,
243 U.S. 426 (1917).
"3Cf. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) and Second Em-
ployers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).24Not a single biography has been written. See Watt and Orlikoff, "The
Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan," 44 Ill. L. Rev. 14, 15 (1949). Harlan's
papers are divided into two parts: a collection of letters and scrapbooks deposited
in the University of Louisville Law School Library and his personal and family
papers collected by his son Richard who had planned to write a biography. The
atter collection has been available to David G. Farrelly, Associate Professor of
Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, and Alan F. Westin,Assistant Professor of Gov't, Cornell University, each of whom is writing a biog-
raphy of Harlan.
rBut see 1 Freund et a., Constitutional Law xxxix (1954) and 2 Freund
et al., Constitutional Law 810 932, 971, 1475, 1566 (1954).21 Concurring opinion, Adamnson v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 62 (1947). See
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to the study of his constitutional doctrines-a 1915 doctoral
thesis!27 The whole story is significantly told by the title of one of
the handful of law review articles28 that have been written con-
cerning the Great Dissenter-"John Marshall Harlan: A Justice
Neglected."29
II. The Man, His Life and His Times
A descendant of Quaker immigrants who first settled in
Delaware in 1687 and then moved west, James Harlan of Boyle
County, Kentucky, became a distinguished lawyer and Whig
politician. When a son was born to him on June 1, 1833, he dis-
played no little prescience in naming the boy after the Great
Chief Justice. Preordained to the law, John Marshall Harlan was
graduated from Centre College at the age of seventeen, pursued
his legal studies at Transylvania College, was admitted to the bar
in 1853, and at the age of twenty-five was elected county court
judge.
After an unsuccessful bid for a Congressional seat, he served
as a presidential elector on the Bell-Everett ticket which carried
his home state, and in 1861 he formed a law partnership with
W. F. Bullock in Louisville. When war rent the nation asunder,
young Harlan labored successfully with his father and Attorney
General Speed to prevent the secession of Kentucky. Breveted
a colonel in the Union Army, he recruited the Tenth Kentucky
Infantry, led his men into battle, and became the acting-com-
mander of a brigade. In 1863 President Lincoln sent his name to
Congress for appointment as a brigadier-general, but the elder
Harlan died and his son resigned from the Army to succeed his
Waite, "How 'Eccentric' Was Mr. Justice Harlan?" 37 Minn. L. Rev. 173 (1953),
for a rebuttal to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's contention.27 Clark, The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Harlan. 33 Johns Hopkins
University Studies 4 (1915).2 8 Brown, "The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan," 46 Amer. L. Rev.
321 (1912); McCracken, "Justice Harlan," 60 Pa. L. Rev. 297 (1912); Knight,
"The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Harlan," 51 Amer. L. Rev. 481 (1917); Watt
and Orlikoff, "The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan," 44 IMI. L. Rev. 13
(1949),; Lewis, "The Appointment of Mr. Justice Harlan," 29 Ind. L.J. 46 (1953);
Waite, "How 'Eccentric Was Mr. Justice Harlan?" 37 Minn. L. Rev. 173 (1953);
Farrelly, "A Sketch of John Marshall Harlan's Pre-Court Career," 10 Vand. L.
Rev. 209 (1957); Westin, "John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Eights of
Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner," 66 Yale L.J. 637 (1957).29 Abraham, "John Marshall Harlan: A Justice Neglected," 41 Va. L. Rev. 871
(1955).
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father as Attorney General of Kentucky. He returned to private
practice in 1867.
The future Justice was first a Whig, as his father before him,
then a conservative Republican, and finally he became a radical
one. He had initially resented the abolition of slavery as "a
flagrant invasion of the right of self-government," but by the 1868
presidential campaign he had so modified his earlier position that
in supporting Grant he could vigorously defend the war amend-
ments. Personally, he was not a successful politican: he was twice
defeated as his party's candidate for the governorship-in 1871
and again in 1875-and his backers failed to secure his nomina-
tion for vice-president in 1872. Four years later, however, as the
head of the Kentucky delegation to the Republican Convention
he played a major role in securing the nomination of Hayes by
switching his state's vote from Bristow, his law partner, to the
future president at a crucial moment in the balloting. Then at
Grant's request Harlan accepted an appointment to the contro-
versial Louisiana Commission which assisted in the settlement of
the Hayes-Tilden electoral contest in that state, and he appears
to have fulfilled his duties with honor and integrity.30
Rutherford B. Hayes was not an ungrateful man: one cannot
be elected unless one is first nominatedl He wished to have his
supporter in his cabinet as his attorney general, a position to
which Harlan ardently aspired, but in the end Hayes decided
against the appointment, perhaps for political reasons. And when
Justice David Davis stepped down from the high court on March
4, 1877, there were many eager candidates for his place on the
bench. The President originally decided upon Benjamin H. Bris-
tow, but Hayes, who owed his own nomination to Harlan's shift
of support from Bristow to himself, now in turn because of sena-
torial opposition to Bristow finally determined to nominate Har-
lan.31 Despite cries of "pay off' raised by political enemies and the
30 See Clark, The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Harlan 11 (1915). Con-
cerning Harlan's pre-court career, see Farrelly, "A Sketch of John Marshall Harlan's
Pre-Court Career," 10 Vand. L. Rev. 209 (1957).
31 Under the date of March 12, 1878 President Hayes wrote in his diary:
"The most important appointments are the judicial. They are for life, and the
Judiciary of the country concerns all interests, public and private. My appoint-
ments will bear examination. .. ." Again on March 26, 1878 he observed in con-
nection with a bitter attack made on him by Senator Howe: "His grievance is the
failure to appoint him Judge." See 2 Warren, The Supreme Court in United
States History 566 (1928).
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virulent editorial attacks of Charles Dana, who unfairly dubbed
the newly-appointed forty-two year old Justice "His Fraud-
ulency," the upper chamber confirmed Harlan's nomination on
November 26, 1877.2 It is noteworthy that Harlan had not been
"a railroad lawyer," but Gustavus Myers has observed that "the
fact that his nomination was confirmed by a Senate controlled
by railroad attorneys and stockholders did not pass unnoticed."33
In 1892 Justice Harlan was called upon to serve as one of the
American Arbitrators on the Bering Sea Tribunal. Eyewitness
Hannis Taylor has recorded his impressions of one of the Tri-
bunal sessions:
I can never forget a scene I once witnessed in Paris, when
the Bering Sea Arbitration Tribunal was sitting there, with
John Marshall Harlan of Kentucky, at one end of the court
and John Tyler Morgan of Alabama at the other. Both were
then in the Indian Summer of their manhood-Harlan with
his noble matchless form, the God-gifted Morgan, with his
beautiful face and head that sculptors might have loved to
copy. My heart swelled with pride as I looked upon those
two great American citizens, who had been opposing gen-
erals in the Civil War, and fancied that I saw in them repro-
ductions of Brutus and Cicero.3 4
A massive man with a splendid physique and ruddy complexion,
Harlan was endowed with a magnificent and distinguished per-
sonal appearance. He was a golf enthusiast, and it is said that at
seventy-five he participated in a bench and bar baseball game
and hit a triple! His personality was as interesting as his physique
was picturesque. Simple, rugged, robust, he was a man given
to plain, hard thinking. Though not an intellectual giant, he was
a man of great ability and his reasoning was guided by a vigorous
and incisive logic. "Subtle and ingenious verbal criticism""' was
foreign to the make-up of this man of sincerity and candor.
3 2 Concerning the controversial Harlan appointment and confirmation, see
Lewis, "The Appointment of Mr. Justice Harlan," 29 Ind. L.J. 46 (1953) -Farrelly,
"John M. Harlan's One-Day Dairy, August 21, 1877," 24 Filson Club History
Quarterly 158 (1950); Frank, "The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices:
Prestige, Principles and Polities," 1941 Wise. L. Rev. 172, 204-210; Hartz "John
M. Harlan in Kentucky, 1855-1877," 14 Filson Club History Quarterly 18 (1940);
and Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court 349-370 (1939).38 Myers, History of the Supreme Court of the United States 555 (1925).
34 Remarks of Hannis Taylor, Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of John Marshall Harlan 30(1911).
35 Dissenting opinion, Harlan, J., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
[Vol. 46,
HARLAN AND THE CONSTITUTION
Justice Harlan married Malvina Shanklin of Evansville, In-
diana in 1865, and during their long and happy life together
three sons were born to them. (A grandson, who bears his name,
is at present serving on the Supreme Court.) Harlan was popular
in Washington social circles and with his colleagues. Mr. Justice
Holmes once confided to a friend: "I do not venture to hope that
Harlan and I will ever agree on an opinion, but he has a place in
my heart. He is the last of the tobacco-spittin' judges."13  Later
in a letter to Pollack he wrote rather enigmatically: "As to
Harlan's qualified concurrence in Kawananakoa v. Polyblan, that
sage, although a man of real power, did not shine either in
analysis or generalization and I never troubled myself much
when he shied. I used to say that he had a powerful vise the
jaws of which couldn't be got nearer than two inches of each
other."37 An intimate friend of Harlan, Justice Day, had this to
say of him:
As we lived near each other in Washington, the
judge and I were much together. We were neighbors in the
old-fashioned sense of that term. In such intimacy I soon
learned to love him for his kindliness and sympathy, and
those great qualities of friendship which endeared him to
all who knew him well. He was a simple-hearted, coura-
geous and lovable man, giving fully of his great strength and
wisdom to those who sought his counsel.38
A deeply religious man, Justice Harlan was dedicated to his
life's work. In the words of Attorney General Wickersham, "The
Constitution and the Bible were the objects of his constant
thought and consideration, and if the latter was to him always
vox Dei, the former, vox populi, was no less so."39 And his col-
league, Justice Brewer, once said: "Harlan retires at night with
one hand on the Constitution and the other on the Bible, safe
and happy in a perfect faith in justice and righteousness."40
In addition to performing his judicial duties, justice Harlan
taught constitutional law for twenty-two years at Columbian
38 As quoted in Bent, Oliver Wendall Holmes 19 (1932).37 Howe, Holmes-Pollack Letters 7-8 (1941).38 Letter of Justice William R. Day to Judge John W. Warrington, Nov. 14,
1911, printed in 56 Ohio Law Bull. 404, 405 (1911).39 Proceedings on the Death of Mr. Justice Harlan, 222 U.S. xii (1911).40 See Farnum, "John Marshall Harlan," 30 A.B.A.J. 576, 577 (1944).
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(now George Washington) University 4' and also during the sum-
mer of 1896 at the University of Virginia Law School. Upon the
occasion of his lecturing at the Union College of Law it was
reported in the Chicago Legal News: "He is a model lecturer and
has but few, if any, equals, and no superiors."42
A powerful orator and a man of firm convictions and strong
feelings, the Justice did not hesitate to lecture his brothers on the
bench when he differed with them. A notable instance occured
when the Court in an 1895 five-to-four decision upheld its earlier
decision to strike down a federal income tax.43 The New York Tri-
bune reported Harlan's conduct on decision day:
Several times he turned in his chair so as to face the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices Field and Gray, at whom he
fairly glared as he shot forth sentences laden with feeling
such as probably never before found expression from an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in a dissenting
opinion. Old lawyers who had practiced at that tribunal for
more than a quarter of a century sat aghast as sentence fol-
lowed sentence. 44
According to an account of the same incident in the New York
Sun:
He displayed a personal excitement during his speech for
the Populist income tax which is even described as passion-
ate. He pounded the desk, shook his finger under the
noses of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Field, turned
more than once almost angrily upon his colleagues of the
majority, and expressed his dissent from their conclusions
in a tone more appropriate to a stump speech at a Populist
barbecue than to an opinion on a question of law before
the Supreme Court of the United States.45
But, as we have seen, he was on the friendliest of terms with
his colleagues. They knew that his words and actions were in-
spired by the sincerity, honesty and integrity of his convictions.
During the thirty-four years John Marshall Harlan served
upon the Court the legal problems that came before him for
adjudication were varied-they ran the gamut of our complex
41 Harlan also lectured on private and public international law at Columbian
University.42 
"Judge Harlan's Lectures," 24 Chicago Legal News 825 (1892).4 3 Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 912 (1895).
44 N.Y. Tribune, May 21, 1895, p. 1, col. 5.
45 N.Y. Sun, May 21, 1895, p. 1, col. 7.
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legal system. But it was the extent of the commerce power and
the significance of the fourteenth amendment that were the major
issues that confronted the nation's highest tribunal during that
period. While Justice Harlan had a keen interest in all phases of
the law, he was particularly at home in the field of the constitu-
tional law, and above all else he was intensely and persistently
concerned with the perservation of the rights and privileges of
the individual citizen. The Justice Black of his times, he did
yeoman service in the protection of civil liberties.
III. Justice Harlan's Civil Liberties Opinions
A. Equal Protection of the Law for the Negro
Radical Republican leaders in Reconstruction Congresses may
have been motivated by practical political considerations: they
may have sought to perpetuate their power through the establish-
ment of a Republican party in the South.46 But whatever their
motives, the intent of the Constitutional amendments they spon-
sored and the enabling legislation 47 they enacted was clear-the
Negro was not to be a second-class citizen. Even Charles Wallace
Collins, archprotagonist of states' rights and "the survival of the
Constitution,"48 admits the "primary purpose of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to elevate the negro to a plane
of equality with the white people and to protect him in his newly
given rights." 9 He quite honestly and accurately adds, "In its
attempts to carry out this ideal, Congress was effectually re-
strained by the Supreme Court."50
A major battle in the war for Negro rights was lost before the
appointment of Justice Harlan to the high court. In the Slaughter-
46 "It is a truism of Reconstruction history that the Radicals enfranchised the
Negro in order to build a Republican party in the South." Buck, The Road to
Reunion 1865-1900 69 (1937).
47See the first Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), the Slave Kidnapping
Act, 14 Stat. 50 (1866), 18 U.S.C.A. 443 (1927), the Anti-Peonage Act, 14 Stat.
546 (1866), 18 U.S.C.A. 444 (1927), The Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140
(1870), The Ku Klux Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) and the second Civil Rights Act,
18 Stat. 835 (1875). For summaries of the Civil Rights Acts, see Carr, Federal
Protection of Civil Rights 33-55, Appendices 1 & 2 (1947) and Biddle, Civil
Rights and the Federal Law in Safeguarding Civil Liberty Today 120 (1945).48 Collins, "Constitutional Aspects of the Truman Civil Rights Program," 44
Ill. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1949). See also Collins, Whither Solid South (1948).49 Collins, the Fourteenth Amendment and the States 161 (1912).50 Ibid.
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House Cases5 and the Reese and Cruikshank decisions 2 the
Supreme Court had developed the thesis that fundamental civil
rights were for the most part incidents of state, not national
citizenship. Charles Warren, "the Supreme Court's most orthodox
historian," has opined:53
Viewed in historical perspective now, however,
there can be no question that the decisions in these cases
were most fortunate. They largely eliminated from National
politics the Negro question which haa so long embittered
Congressional debates; they relegated the burden and duty
of protecting the negro to the States, to whom they properly
belonged; and they served to restore confidence in the Na-
tional Court in the Southern States.5 4
Whether one is likely to agree with Mr. Warren, depends upon
the price one is willing to pay for peace and upon the value one
places on human rights. In any event, because of these decisions,
Justice Harlan could but wage a sniper's war throughout his long
years of service on the bench. Yet, if he was defeated in many a
skirmish, he fought nobly on the side that was eventually to win
the war, after the loss of many battles.
In 1883 five cases-one each from Kansas, California, Missouri,
New York and Tennessee-came before the Court. In each was
presented the common question of the constitutionality of the
Civil Bights Act of 1875. Section One of the Act provided that all
persons regardless of race, color or previous condition of servitude
"shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accom-
modations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public
conveyances on land and water, theatres and other places of pub-
lic amusement," while Section Two imposed penalties upon viola-
tors. Four of the Civil Rights Cases involved discrimination
against Negroes: in a railway train, a theatre and in hotels.
In the New York case, discrimination against a person whose race
was not stated, was alleged to have been practiced in an opera
house.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, declared
unconstitutional both sections of the Act as applied to the cases in
51 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
52 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875).5ORodell, Nine Men 113 (1955).
542 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 608 (1928).
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question. The fourteenth amendment had given Congress the
power of enacting only corrective legislation against state action,
not that of individuals. The challenged legislation was defective,
according to Bradley, because "it steps into the domain of local
jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals
in society towards each other, and imposes sanctions for the
enforcement of those rules, without referring in any manner to
any sufficient action of the State or its authorities."55 This ex-
ceeded Congressional authority, for the "civil rights, such as are
guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be
impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals. .. .""' The Justice
drew a neat distinction between the possession of rights and their
enjoyment. The aggrieved parties no doubt found it a little dif-
ficult to understand that an "individual cannot deprive a man of
his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in the
courts, or to be a witness or a juror. . . ."5 But perhaps it all
became clear when the spokesman for the majority went on to
admit that an individual could "by force or fraud, interfere with
the enjoyment of the right in a particular case."-" While the
analysis may have been philosophically sound, its application
made for political injustice in the real world of human relations.
The Court likewise rejected the contention that the Civil
Rights Act was a valid legislative enforcement of the thirteenth
amendment: "Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of the
inn, the public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing the
accommodation, be justly regarded as imposing any badge of
slavery or servitude. . . .?"-59 According to Justice Bradley, "It
would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make
it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit
to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he
will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or
theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business."60
Justice Harlan was the lone dissenter. To him it seemed that
the majority opinion rested upon grounds "entirely too narrow and
artificial," and that "the substance and spirit" of the war amend-
55 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883).
6 Id. at 17.
5 Tbid.
58 ibid.
59Id. at 24.
o Ibid.
1958]
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ments had been sacrificed through a "subtle and ingenious verbal
criticism:" 61
Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty,
and for the purpose of securing, through national legisla-
tion, if need be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and
belonging to American citizenship, have been so construed
as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish,
which they attempted to accomplish, and which they sup-
posed they had accomplished by changes in their funda-
mental law.62
The Great Dissenter reasoned that the thirteenth amendment was
intended to effect more than the mere exemption from technical
slavery, the ownership of one person by another; he pleaded for
a more realistic and humane understanding of what constitutes
"a badge of slavery." Further, he made the point that the very
states which had violently opposed the abolition of slavery would
not insure the enjoyment of fundamental rights to the recently
emancipated Negro. With respect to the fourteenth amendment,
he argued for a broader concept of the public nature of business
enterprises: the fundamental rights of citizens should be free
from infringement, not only by the state and state officials, but
also by "any corporation or individual wielding power under State
authority for the public benefit or the public convenience."0' 3 It
was Justice Harlan's contention that the "appropriate legislation"
clauses of both the thirteenth and the fourteenth amendments
provided the authority for the federal Civil Rights Act:
Under given circumstances, that which the court character-
izes as corrective legislation might be deemed by Congress
appropriate and entirely sufficient. Under other circum-
stances primary direct legislation may be required. But it
is for Congress, not the judiciary, to say that legislation is
appropriate-that is-best adapted to the end to be attained.
The judiciary may not, with safety to other institutions,
enter the domain of legislative discretion, and dictate the
means which Congress shall employ in the exercise of its
granted powers.6
61 Id. at 26.
62 Ibid.
63 Id. at 59.
64Id. at 51.
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... With all respect for the opinions of others, I insist that
the national legislature may, without transcending the limits
of the Constitution, do for human liberty and the funda-
mental rights of American citizenship, what it did, with the
sanction of this court, for the protection of slaves and the
rights of the masters of fugitive slaves.65
... Today, it is the colored race which is denied, by corpora-
tions and individuals wielding public authority, rights
fundamental in their freedom and citizenship. At some
future time, it may be some other race that will fall under
the ban of discrimination.66
His Civil Rights dissent was Justice Harlan's personal "favor-
ite." An eloquent plea for human rights, it was described by
Roscoe Conkling as "the noblest opinion in the history of our
country, great in learning and understanding of our system of
government and great in statesmanship."67
There was one area of civil rights litigation in which Harlan
was able to speak for the Court-the exclusion of Negroes from
jury service. In the 1881 case of Neal v. Delaware,68 the Great
Dissenter, this time the majority spokesman, reaffirmed the doc-
trine of the well-known Strauder decision 9 of the year before by
determining that the indictment of a colored defendant should
be quashed because of the discriminatory exclusion of members
of his race from the grand jury. He was also called upon to write
the opinion for the Court when in Smith v. Mississippi70 it was
held that the facts stated in an affidavit of an accused must be
verified by independent evidence of discrimination to warrant
the quashing of an indictment.
While it is to the Court's credit that it would not tolerate racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors, it was not as courageous
05 Id. at 58.
66 Id. at 62.6 7 As quoted in Knight, "The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Harlan," 51 Amer.
L. Rev. 481, 499 (1917).68103 U.S. 370 (1881).
60 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
70 162 U.S. 592 (1896). For other opinions on this subject by Justice Harlan,
see Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565
1896); and Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1905). For other cases decided
uring Harlan's tenure on the Court, see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 303 (1880);
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 839 (1880)- Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900);
Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903); Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U.S.
426 (1903); and Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904).
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when disfranchised Negroes appeared before it to seek redress.
The constitution of Alabama contained provisions that in effect
operated to prevent colored persons from voting, and in Giles v.
Harris71 it was sought to have these provisions declared unconsti-
tutional and to require the voting authorities to enroll qualified
Negroes. The Circuit Court dismissed the petition on the grounds
that damages of $2,000 were not averred. Justice Holmes, writing
the opinion for the majority of the Court, made short shrift of
the jurisdictional quibbling, but he also bypassed the constitu-
tional question. After due deference was paid to the old lawyer's
tale that the protection of purely political rights is not within the
province of equity, the majority spokesman spelled out two dif-
ficulties that were just too much for him. Inasmuch as the plain-
tiff wanted to be registered under a voting system which he him-
self claimed was unconstitutional, the Court could not become a
party to the unlawful scheme by accepting it and adding another
voter to the fraudulent lists. Then, too, Holmes, the realist, got
the better of Holmes, the idealist: if the people of Alabama did
not want Negroes to vote, there was not much the Court could
do about it! Justice Harlan did not do too much better. He de-
voted over ten pages to explaining why the Court should not have
passed on the merits of the case at all because the Circuit Court
did not have jurisdiction. He did add, though, that it was his
conviction that "upon the facts alleged in the bill (if the record
showed a sufficient value of the matter in dispute) the plaintiff
is entitled to relief in respect to his right to be registered as a
voter."72 On this point, he and dissenting Justice Brewer were in
agreement. Justice Holmes in his opinion had suggested that if
the aggrieved party were to proceed at law, perhaps his position
would be sustained. The plaintiff took the Justice up on this and
brought an action for damages, but he fared no better. Resort
was again had to narrow technical reasoning: how could the elec-
tion board deprive the plaintiff of his federal rights if the board
had no authority to act? Justice Harlan again dissented.73
Shortly before Justice Harlan became a member of the Court,
7' 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
72 Id. at 504. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Brewer at 488.
Justice Brown also dissented.
73 Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904).
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it had been decided in Hall v. DeCuie4 that a statute enacted by
a carpetbag Louisiana legislature prohibiting racial discrimination
on carriers was unconstitutional as a burden on interstate com-
merce. Then, in 1888 Mississippi passed a statute that required
racial segregation on its railroads. The state supreme court said
the statute applied only to intra-state commerce, and the Supreme
Court, distinguishing Hall v. DeCuir, gave its approval.75 Harlan
did not have quite as much confidence in the Mississippi court
as seven of his brothers did, and he was nonplused by the
majority's reasoning. Justice Bradley joined him in the spirited
dissent by which he expressed his disapproval:
In its application to passengers on vessels engaged in inter-
state commerce, the Louisiana enactment forbade the sep-
aration of the white and black races while such vessels were
within the limits of that State. The Mississippi statute, in
its application to passengers on railroad trains employed in
interstate commerce, requires such separation of races, while
those trains are within that State. I am unable to perceive
how the former is a regulation on interstate commerce, and
the other is not. It is difficult to understand how a state
enactment, requiring the separation of the white and black
races on interstate carriers of passengers, is a regulation of
commerce among the States, while a similar enactment for-
bidding such separation is not a regulation of that char-
acter.71
When a case involving a similar Kentucky statute came before
the high court ten years later, the majority reached the same con-
clusion; Harlan again dissented.77 It took some time, but at last
in 1946 the Court in no uncertain terms proscribed segregated
accomodations and seating arrangements in inter-state transporta-
tion .7
The year 1896 was a fateful one in the history of Negro civil
liberties-it was the year of Plessy v. Ferguson.79 By this time
Louisiana had ousted the carpetbaggers, and a typical "Jim Crow"
7495 U.S. 485 (1877).
75 Louisiana, New Orleans & Texas Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587
(1890).
10id. at 594.
77 C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900). See also South Coving-
ton & Cinn. St. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399 (1920) and C.C. & E. Ry. Co.
v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 408 (1920).
78 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 372 (1946).
79163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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law was in force. Railways carrying passengers in the state were
required to furnish "equal but separate accomodations for the
white, and colored races" either in separate coaches or by parti-
tions, and no persons were "to occupy seats in coaches other than,
the ones, assigned to them, on account of the race they belong
to."80 Criminal sanctions were provided for non-complying rail-
roads and recalcitrant passengers. A Negro by southern definition
-the person was an octoroon who could have passed for a
Caucasian-was arrested for having violated the law. The Su-
preme Court, which consisted of six justices appointed by Republi-
can presidents and three Cleveland apointees, gave its blessing
to segregation and sanctioned the unfortunate "separate-but-
equal" shibboleth by holding that the Louisiana statute was a
valid exercise of the police power. Justice Brown in a rather
cynical and superficial opinion observed that the state law merely
implied a legal distinction between the races and if the Negro
considered it as a badge of inferiority that was only because he
chose to put that construction upon it. Thus did a decision of the
nation's highest court become the bulwark of segregation for
almost sixty years.
All the Justices on the Court except Harlan were either born
in the North or appointed to the bench from that part of the
country. An ex-slave-owner, who had at one time protested
against the abolition of slavery by federal authority, he alone dis-
sented,81 and he did so with both indignation and eloquence:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there
is in this country no superior, dominant ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before
the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guar-
anteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is,
therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final
expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached
the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate
the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon
the basis of race.82
80 La. Acts 1890, No. 111, p. 152.
81 Justice Brewer did not sit on the case.
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The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race,
while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude,
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality
before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be
justified upon any legal grounds.
... We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people
above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that
boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the
brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of
our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law.8
The "separate-but-equaY' doctrine soon found its way into the
field of education. A Kentucky statute made it unlawful, under
pain of heavy penalties, for a school to admit both Negro and
white students. Berea College, a private corporation, was con-
victed under the law, and upon appeal to the state court of ap-
peals the constitutionality of the entire act was upheld. On writ
of error to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Brewer,
speaking for the majority, sidestepped the constitutional question;
the conviction was sustained on the grounds that the state court
had considered the provisions of the statute to be separable and
that a state might adopt such regulations with respect to its
domestic corporations.8 4 Justices Holmes and Moody concurred
in the result, while Harlan and Day dissented. (Justice Day in
the 1917 case of Buchanan v. Warley 5 interpreted the Berea Col-
lege case as affirming the Kentucky state court "solely" upon the
reserved power of the state legislature to amend, alter or repeal
the charters of its domestic corporations.) Justice Harlan real-
istically stressed that "[i]t was the teaching of pupils of the two
races together, or in the same school, no matter by whom or under
whose authority, which the legislature sought to prevent. The
manifest purpose was to prevent the association of white and
colored persons in the same school." 6 He thought it the Court's
duty to consider the validity of the entire statutory scheme, and
he felt that "in its essential parts the statute is an arbitrary invasion
of the rights of liberty and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment against hostile state action and is, therefore, void."87
83 Id. at 562.8 4 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
85 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See also the citation of the Court to the Berea case
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).86 211 U.S. 45, 62 (1908).
87 Id. at 67.
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He observed that "in the eye of the law, the right to enjoy one's
religious belief, unmolested by any human power, is no more
sacred nor more fully or distinctly recognized than is the right to
impart and receive instruction not harmful to the public. The
denial of either right would be an infringement of the liberty in-
herent in the freedom secured by the fundamental law. '88
Justice Harlan loved the blue-grass country-he once shed tears
when a Kentucky case was being argued before the Court-and
he loved its people. But above all else, he desired justice for all
Kentuckians, colored and white. His Berea College dissent, which
was subjected to no small amount of criticism in his home state,
underscores his adherence to the principles in which he believed.
Indeed, the American Negro has had no greater judicial defender
and champion than John Marshall Harlan of Kentucky.
It took the Court a long time, but eventually it began to see
the light-Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt v. Painter, and McLaurin,8 9
established rigid tests of equality for separate state graduate and
professional school facilities. Finally, ffty-eight years after Plessy
v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan's dissent was in effect adopted by the
Warren Court as its unanimous opinion with respect to the field
of public education." A solemn anathema was pronoumced
against the "separate-but-equal" doctrine: "separate," per se,
can never be "equal"; "separate", per se, is "inherently unequal."
The Court has indicated that it feels the same way concerning
segregated city bus facilities and state-enforced segregation on
intra-state private carriers, 91 and it is soon likely to administer the
technical legal coup de grace to segregation in these areas. More-
over, the Court has consistently refused to reverse lower court
decisions requiring integration in public parks, playgrounds,
88 Id. at 68.
89 Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); and McLaurin v. Okla-
homa State Bd. of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). For the latest development in
this area of the law, see Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S. 413
(1956), in which the Court held that a Negro is entitled to prompt admission to
a state law school under the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified
candidates; the decision in Brown v. Bd. of Education, infra note 90, which con-
templates some delay in the desegregation of public elementary and secondary
schools, was held to have no application to a case such as this.
90 Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharp, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
91 See e.g., South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Fleming, 351 U.S. 901 (1956),
dismissing appeal from 224 F. 2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955).
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swimming pools, beaches and golf courses.92 It would seem that
the "separate-but-equal" doctrine is legally dead as far as public
facilities are concerned. Nor is it too much to hope for that in
the end the nation will see, as Justice Harlan did so clearly, that
to travel on non-segregated "private' common carriers, to shop in
non-segregated "private" stores and to fre~juent non-segregated
"private" places of amusement are not merely social privileges,
but civil rights I
B. The Bill of Rights, the States and the Fourteenth Amendment
Whether the first eight amendments were intended to be made
applicable to the states through incorporation in the fourteenth
would seem to be an open historical question.93 Be that as it may,
the Supreme Court has consistently held from Hurtado94 and
Twining95 through Palko6 to Adamson97 and Rochin s that the
entire bill of rights has not been carried over and made applicable
to the states by either the due process or the privileges and im-
munities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Instead, the Court
has adopted a pick-and-choose technique under the due process
clause which, according to Justice Black, has resulted in the
substitution of the Court's "day to day opinion of what kind of
trial is fair and decent for the kind of trial which the Bill of Rights
92 See e.g., Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) and Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
93 See, e.g., Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution (1953); Crosskey, "Charles
Fairman, 'Legislative History,' and the Constitutional Limitations on State Au-
thority," 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1954); Fairman, "The Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental Authority," 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
40 (1953); Dissenting opinion and appendix, Black, J., Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947); Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding," 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949); Watt
and Orlikoff, 'The' Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan," 44 ]1M. L. Rev. 14(1949); Boudin, "Truth and Fiction about the Fourteenth Amendment," 16 N.Y.
U.L.Q. 19 (1938); Graham, The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," 47 Yale L.J. 371 (1938); 2 Boudin, Government by Judiciary, Cbs. XXI-
XXIV (1932); Collins, Fourteenth Amendment and the Sttes (1912); Corwin,
"The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Mich. L. Rev. 643(1909); Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amen nt (1908); and Guthrie,
The Fourteenth Article of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States(1898).94 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
05 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
96 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
K Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).98 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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guarantees." A full carry-over has been accorded only the first
amendment freedoms of religion, speech and the press.9
While Justice Harlan has not been an "eccentric exception" on
the question, °° he was the chief judicial proponent of the incorpo-
ration doctrine until recent times. In Hurtado v. California01' the
Court through Mr. Justice Matthews decided that due process of
law does not require as one of its essential elements the indictment
by a grand jury for a capital crime. Matthews concluded that "any
legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned
by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legis-
lative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which re-
gards and-preserves these principles of liberty and justice, ["cer-
tain fundamental rights"] must be held to be due process of
law."'0 2 Justice Harlan, relying in large part upon an historical
argument, dissented. According to his interpretation, "'Due proc-
ess of law,' within the meaning of the National Constitution, does
not import one thing with reference to the powers of the States,
and another with reference to the power of the general govern-
ment."0 a Governmental action which is forbidden by a constitu-
tional provision or by the customs and practices of the English
legal tradition cannot constitute due process of law. The Great
Dissenter differed with his brethren because they "while con-
ceding that the requirement of due process of law protects the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice," adjudged "in effect,
that an immunity or right, recognized at the common law to be
essential to personal security, jealously guarded by our National
Constitution against violation by ...the general Government,
and expressly or impliedly recognized, when the 14th Amendment
was adopted, in the Bill of Rights or Constitution of every State
*.. is, yet, not a fundamental principle in governments estab-
lished, as those of the States of the Union are, to secure for the
citizen liberty and justice and, therefore, is not involved in that
due process of law required in proceedings conducted under the
99 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293
U.S. 245 (1934); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); and
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Education, 332 U.S. 203 (1948).
100 See supra note 26.
101 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
302 Id. at 537.
103 Id. at 541.
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sanction of a State."" 4 He reaffirmed these views by dissenting
in Baldwin v. Kansas'0 5 and Bolln v. Nebraska.0 6
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 07 a case involving the applicability to
the States of "the cruel and unusual punishment" proscription of
the eighth amendment, a writ of error was dismissed on the
ground that the record did not present a federal question. Justice
Field dissented; he felt that the commerce clause provided a
basis for the Court's jurisdiction and that the punishment in-
flicted upon the defendant (54 years for 870 liquor violations)
was forbidden by the eighth amendment as incorporated in the
fourteenth. Harlan, who also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Brewer "in the main" concurred, agreed "with Justice
Field, that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, not
one of the fundamental rights of life, liberty or property, recog-
nized and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States,
can be denied or abridged by a State in respect to any person
within its jurisdiction. These rights are, principally, enumerated
in the earlier Amendments of the Constitution." 08 And among
them is "immunity from cruel and unusual punishments, secured
by the Eighth Amendment against Federal action, and by the
Fourteenth Amendment against denial or abridgment by the
States."'09
There are two trial-by-jury cases in which Justice Harlan was
the spokesman for the Court: in Callan v. Wilson 10 it was held
that the provisions in the Constitution relating to trial by jury
must be observed in the District of Columbia, and in Thompson v.
Utah"' a section in the constitution of Utah, providing for the
trial of non-capital cases by a jury of eight, was struck down as
ex post facto in its application to felonies committed before the
territory became a state. But he did not write the majority
opinion in Maxwell v. Dow,"12 which involved a conviction by
an eight-man jury for a robbery committed after Utah's admission
as a state. Rather, it was Justice Peckham, who, after reaffirming
104 Id. at 588.
105 129 U.S. 52 (1889).
106 176 U.S. 83 (1900).
107 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
108 Id. at 370.
109 Ibid.
110 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
111170 U.S. 343 (1898).
112 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
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the Hurtado doctrine that the due process clause does not require
indictment by a grand jury in a state prosecution, and after de-
ciding that the privileges and immunities clause does not neces-
sarily include all the rights protected by the first eight amend-
ments, went on to hold that Utah's scheme for trial by a jury of
eight, instead of twelve, did not violate the provisions of either
clause. This was a matter for the people of each state to decide
for themselves, as long as the same procedure was used for all.
The Peckham opinion intimated that with respect to the four-
teenth amendment a distinction was to be made between matters
of mere procedure and more fundamental rights. Here was a
clear indication that the Court was on its way toward turning the
amendment on its head by enshrining the doctrine of substantive
due process, while minimizing its procedural aspects.
A vigorous dissent was registered by Harlan, and he again
grounded his argument upon the history of the Anglo-American
legal system. He was shocked to think that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment would preclude the taking of private
property by a state without just compensation, but would allow a
citizen to be deprived of life and liberty by a procedure which is
repugnant to that authorized at the time the Constitution was
adopted and which is expressly forbidden in the national Bill of
Rights. "If the court had not ruled otherwise," he wrote, "I
should have thought it indisputable that when by the Fourteenth
Amendment it was declared that no State should make or enforce
any law abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, nor deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law, the people of the United States
put upon the States, the same restrictions that had been imposed
upon the National Government in respect as well of the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States as of the protec-
tion of the fundamental rights of life, liberty and property."113
He concluded his dissent rather prophetically with an eloquent
admonition that was to go unheeded:
If I do not wholly misapprehend the scope and legal effect
of the present decision, the Constitution of the United States
does not stand in the way of any State striking down guar-
antees of life and liberty that English-speaking people have
113 Id. at 614.
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for centuries regarded as vital to personal security, and
which the men of the Revolutionary period universally
claimed as the birthright of freemen. 14
In 1908 came Twining v. New Jerseyn 5 with the important
question whether exemption from compulsory self-incrimination
in the state courts is secured by any of the clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. An answer in the negative was given by
Justice Moody for the Court, and by this time there was no dif-
ficulty in citing authorities the Court itself had created. Of
course, the fourteenth amendment does protect against state in-
fringement of those rights and privileges that were part of the
"law of the land" prior to the separation of the colonies from the
mother-country, those which constitute an element of due process
of law, BUT-exemption from compulsory self-incrimination, the
Court said, is not one of them. Justice Felix Frankfurter has
observed that Twining is an example of the "judicial process at its
best.""" Of course, any such evaluation as this depends upon
one's concept of the judicial process and its function, and what
one expects of it. While the Twining majority spokesman, Justice
Moody, admitted that the incorporation-of-the-first-eight-in-the-
fourteenth "view has been, at different times, expressed by
justices of this court . . . and was undoubtedly that entertained
by some of those who framed the Amendment," he concluded
that it was "not profitable to examine the weighty arguments in
its favor, for the question is no longer open in this court."" 7 Is
this the Court at its best or its worst?
Once again the Great Dissenter was the lone dissenter. He
had another look at history and reached the same conclusion-the
fourteenth amendment was intended to secure against encroach-
ment by the states "the privileges and immunities mentioned in
the original amendments, and universally regarded as our heritage
of liberty from the common law"."18 Not only was the right to
immunity from self-incrimination thus protected against state
contravention by the privileges and immunities clause, but in
addition it was guaranteed by the due process clause. Inasmuch
"14 Id. at 617.
115211 U.S. 78 (1908).
116 Concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 19,
59 (1947).
117 211 U.S. 78, 98 (1908).
118 Id. at 122.
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as the court had "heretofore, upon the fullest consideration,
declared that the compelling of a citizen of the United States,
charged with crime, to be a witness against himself, was a rule
abhorrent to the instincts of Americans, was in violation of uni-
versal American law, was contrary to the principles of free gov-
ernment and a weapon of despotic power which could not abide
the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom,"
Justice Harlan could not "agree that a State may make that rule
a part of its law and binding on citizens, despite the Constitution
of the United States."'"
The high watermark of adherence to John Marshall Harlan's
views was the 1947 case of Adamson v. California.120 By a five-to-
four decision the Court still maintained its traditional position,
but Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge, those staunch
judicial champions of civil liberties, were of the opinion that the
fourteenth amendment had carried over and incorporated the Bill
of fights to the extent of making the first eight amendments ap-
plicable to the states. Justice Black refused to "consider the Bill
of Bights to be an outworn 18th Century 'strait jacket' as the
Twining opinion did,"' 2' and he bolstered his opinion by an ap-
pendix devoted to the legislative history of the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 But Justice Black seemed to imply that the amendment
protected against state infringement only the rights and privileges
guaranteed by the Bill of Bights. Justices Murphy and Rutledge
were not prepared to agree to this limitation, for occasions might
arise "where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to
fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional
condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the ab-
sence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights."2 3
Although the untimely deaths of Justices Murphy and Rut-
ledge have made it unlikely that the Court will reverse itself in
the near future, it is not inconceivable that eventually the posi-
tion of John Marshall Harlan will prevail in this matter as it has
119 Id. at 127.
120332 U.S. 19 (1947).
121 Dissenting opinion, Black, J., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 89
(1947). But see Fainnan, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Bights? The Original Understanding," 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949) and other
material cited in footnote 93 supra.
122 Id. at 92-123.
12 3 Dissenting opinion, Murphy, J., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 124
(1947).
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with respect to the protection of the civil liberties of the Negro
race.
C. A Miscellany of Cases
One of the principal ways in which the protection of civil
liberties has been assured over the years has been by an insistence
upon strict compliance with procedural requirements in criminal
prosecutions. In Crain v. United States"2 4 the accused was con-
victed of having violated a federal forgery statute, but the record
failed to show that he had ever been formally arraigned or that
he had pleaded to the indictment. The Supreme Court split five-
to-three, reversed the conviction and remanded the case so that
the defendant might be properly arraigned, plead to the indict-
ment and be retried. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority,
conceded that "the Constitution does not, in terms, declare that
a person accused of crime cannot be tried until it be demanded
of him that he plead, or unless he pleads, to the indictment."'2 5
He was of the opinion, however, that "due process of law requires
that the accused plead, or be ordered to plead, or, in a proper
case, that a plea of not guilty be filed for him, before his trial can
rightfully proceed."1 26 He concluded that the record "should
show distinctly, and not by inference merely, that every step in-
volved in due process of law, and essential to a valid trial, was
taken in the trial court.'127
When the Court was presented with the question whether the
written waiver of a jury by a defendant invalidates his conviction
for a petty offense, eight of the Justices thought not, but Justice
Harlan dissented. 28 Assuming for the purposes of argument that
the jury trial provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted
in the light of the fact that at common law trials concerning minor
offenses were conducted without a jury, if parliament so provided,
he contended that "[no criminal offense or crime against the
United States can be tried except by jury, if the plea be not guilty,
unless it be a petty offense or crime, and unless the legislative de-
partment declare that it may be so tried."1 29 Since congress had
124 162 U.S. 625 (1896).
125 Id. at 645.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
120 Id. at 98.
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not done so with respect to the offense at issue, the convictions
should have been reversed.
An extremely interesting factual situation as well as a sig-
nificant legal issue came before the Court in the case of Mahon v.
Justice.'" Mahon, who had been indicted for murder in Ken-
tucky, escaped to West Virginia. While consideration was being
given by the Governor of West Virginia to an application from
the Governor of Kentucky for the surrender of Mahon as a fugi-
tive from justice, a body of armed men illegally abducted him to
Kentucky, where he was taken into custody by the local authori-
ties. The Governor of West Virginia and Mahon petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release and safe return to
West Virginia. Seven of the Justices upheld the lower court's
denial of relief: no right secured by the Constitution or the laws
of the United States had been violated by the arrest of Mahon in
Kentucky and his imprisonment there. Mr. Justice Bradley, how-
ever, was of the opinion that Mahon had been kidnapped and
carried into Kentucky in violation of the Constitution and was
detained there in continued violation thereof inasmuch as the
Constitution provides a peaceable remedy for the surrender of
fugitives. And even "if the party himself is precluded from setting
up his wrongful abduction as a defense to an indictment and per-
haps precluded from demanding his discharge on habeas cor-
pus,"'3' here West Virginia had intervened for Mahon's protection
and sued out the writ. Further, Mahon's own application for the
writ was well-grounded, for he was "not in the situation of a
criminal who had been abducted from a State, which takes no
interest in his case."132 Since Mahon's restoration had been de-
manded by the state of West Virginia, the writ had been properly
issued at his own instance and/or that of the state, and he should
have been discharged and permitted to return to West Virginia.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in Bradley's opinion.
D. Indians, the Chinese and Justice Harlan
John Elk, who had been born a member of one of the Indian
tribes, severed his tribal connections and took up his residence
130 127 U.S. 700 (1887).
131 Id. at 718.
132 Ibid.
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among the white citizens of Nebraska. When he was denied the
right to vote, the question arose whether he was a citizen of the
United States. The lower court's decision against his contention
that the refusal of the registration officer to place him on the
voting rolls constituted a violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments was sustained by the Supreme Court.133 Justice
Gray reasoned that Indians could become citizens only through
the regular process of naturalization; Elk had not been natural-
ized; ergo,-. That Elk had been born in the United States was
immaterial. Indians could not make themselves United States
citizens just by living apart from their tribes, and since Elk was
not a citizen, he had no right to vote.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan, after an examination
of the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment, especially
that of the rejected proposal to insert after the words "subject to
the jurisdiction thereof" the words "excluding Indians not taxed,"
reached the conclusion that the amendment was intended "to
grant national citizenship to every person of the Indian race in
this country who was unconnected with any Tribe and who re-
sided, in good faith, outside of Indian reservations and within
one of the States or Territories of the Union."' 34 Moreover, a Con-
gressional act of 1866 has provided: "All persons born in the
United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States." ' Since Elk had been born in the United States, had cut
himself off from his tribe, had become a bona fide resident of
Nebraska and was subject to taxation in that state and other
burdens imposed upon its residents of every race, he was a citizen
of the United States. If this were not the case, then, Justice
Harlan observed, "the 14th Amendment has wholly failed to ac-
complish, in respect of the Indian race, what we think was in-
tended by it," and, the Great Dissenter concluded, "there is still
in this country a despised and rejected class of persons, with no
nationality whatsoever; who, born in our territory, owing no al-
legiance to any foreign power, and subject, as residents of the
States, to all the burdens of government, are yet not members of
133 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
134 Id. at 118.
185 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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any political community nor entitled to any of the rights, privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States."'30
The Elk case was decided in 1884; in 1887 Congress made
citizens of all Indians in Elk's situation regardless of their personal
desires.
Another Indian case worthy of note is Talton v. Mayes,'3" in
which eight of the Nine Men determined that neither the fifth
amendment nor Congressional enactments applied to legislation
of the Cherokee nation so as to require the initiation of criminal
prosecutions by grand jury indictment. As might be expected in
the light of his views expressed in the Hurtado case,' 38 Mr. Justice
Harlan dissented-this time without opinion.
Justice Harlan wrote two opinions interpreting the Chinese
Restriction Act of 1882, as amended in 1884. In the Chew Heong
case139 as majority spokesman he construed the Act's provisions
concerning the certificate of identification which was to be pro-
duced by a Chinese laborer as the "only evidence permissible to
establish his right of re-entry" into the United States as not being
applicable to a Chinese laborer who had become a resident under
a valid treaty and had left the country before the Congressional
enactment. But in the case of United States v. Jung Ah Lung"0
Harlan registered a dissent which was not in keeping with his char-
acteristic liberalism. A Chinese laborer, who had resided in this
country for three years, returned to China in 1883 after having
obtained a certificate of identification. Unfortunately, a band
of Chinese pirates robbed him of his certificate. When he pre-
sented himself for re-entry into the United States at San Francisco,
there was no doubt that he was the Jung Ah Lung to whom a
certificate had been issued-the records proved it. The 1882 Act
expressly provided that a Chinese laborer was not permitted to
re-enter the country by land without producing a certificate, and
the 1884 amendment made such a certificate the "only evidence
permissible" to establish the right of re-entry. Justice Harlan,
together with Justices Field and Lamar, felt that Congress in 1882
could not have intended one rule for re-entry by land and another
136 112 U.S. 94, 122 (1884).
137 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
13 8 See p. 426 supra.
139 Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884), Field and Bradley,
J.J., dissenting.
140 124 U.S. 621 (1888).
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for re-entry by sea, and that the 1884 "only evidence" amendment
did not declare a new rule but only indicated more clearly the
1882 intent of Congress. Harlan expressed the view that if Jung
Ah Lung's "certificate was forcibly taken from him by a band of
pirates while he was absent," that was "his misfortune." "That
fact ought not to defeat what was manifestly the intention of the
legislative branch of the government."' 41 The majority of the
Court, however, held that Jung Ah Lung should be allowed to
re-enter the country: the 1884 amendment was not retroactive-
the Court cited Harlan's Chew Heong opinion 42-and the 1882
Act did not say that a Chinese laborer returning by a vessel could
not re-enter without producing a certificate.
In United States v. Wong Kim Ark 43 the Court determined
that a child born in the United States of Chinese nationals with a
permanent domicile and residence here becomes a citizen of this
country at the time of birth by virtue of the first clause of the
fourteenth amendment. But Harlan concurred in a dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Fuller that sought to avoid what might
reasonably be considered to be an arbitrary, compulsory imposi-
tion of dual nationality.
When the civil liberties of Chinese aliens were imperiled,
Justice Harlan entered the lists with his usual vigor and devotion.
A band of men in California by force and intimidation drove a
group of Chinese aliens from their homes and places of business
and from the town in which they resided, and for several hours
held them captives on a steamboat barge. The men were con-
victed of having violated the Civil Bights Act. Upon appeal by
one of the defendants to the Supreme Court, his conviction was
reversed. The Court, while admitting that the federal government
had the power to provide for the punishment of those guilty of
depriving Chinese subjects of any rights guaranteed them by an
1880 treaty, concluded that it had not done so.144 One section of
the Civil Bights Act was declared invalid, another inapplicable,
141 Id. at 639. Concerning Harlan's views on iudicial legislation, see, for
example, his opinions in United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37 (1877); The Civil
Bights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S.
601 (1895); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897); Houghton v. Payne, 194
U.S. 88 (1904); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); and
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See p. 445 infra.
142 See note 139 supra.
143 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
144 Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
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and a third was held to pertain only to the protection of citizens,
not aliens. Justice Field wrote a dissenting opinion, as did the
Great Dissenter. Harlan again spoke out in favor of the constitu-
tionality of the entire federal Civil Rights legislative program
and again voiced his disapproval of the Court's decision in the
Civil Rights Cases. He expressed the view that the "denial by the
State of the equal protection of the laws to persons within its
jurisdiction may arise as well from the failure or inability of the
state authorities to give that protection, as from unfriendly enact-
ments." 45 Further, he interpreted an admittedly valid key sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Act as applicable to both aliens and
citizens. It seemed to Harlan that the majority were saying that
"if Chinamen, having a right under the Treaty [of 1880-81] to re-
main in our country, are forcibly driven from their places of
business, the Government of the United States is without power
in its own courts to protect them against such violence, or to
punish those, who, in this way subject them to ill treatment."' 4"
The champion of civil liberties for all persons was quick to warn
that "if this be so, as to Chinamen lawfully in the United States,
it must be equally true as to the citizens or subjects of every other
foreign Nation, residing or doing business here under the sanction
of treaties with their respective governments." 47
E. Peonage and Slavery
In Clyatt v. United States'14 the defendant was indicted on the
charge of "returning" certain persons to a condition of peonage
in violation of the federal Anti-Peonage Act which provided for
the criminal punishment of "every person who holds, arrests,
returns, or causes any person to be held, arrested, or returned
* . . to a condition of peonage." The majority spokesman, Mr.
Justice Brewer, determined that the statute was constitutional as
appropriate legislation to effectuate the purposes of the thirteenth
amendment, and he admitted that there was abundant evidence
from which the jury could have found that the defendant went
to Florida and caused the arrest of two Negroes on the charge of
larceny as an excuse for securing their custody so he could take
145 Id. at 700.
146 Id. at 694.
147 Ibid.
148 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
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them back to Georgia to work out a debt. But since there was
"not a scintilla of testimony to show that Gordon and Ridley
[the Negroes] were ever theretofore in a condition of peonage,"149
the defendant could not possibly have "returned" them to peonage
as charged in the indictment; hence, the conviction was reversed.
Justice Harlan dissented, observing that the "accused made no
objection to the submission of the case to the jury." He felt that
it was "going very far to hold in a case like this, disclosing bar-
barities of the worst kind against these negroes, that the trial
court erred in sending the case to the jury."150
In another case-Hodges v. United States'51-the Court, again
speaking through Mr. Justice Brewer, reversed the conviction of
defendants who had attempted by force and intimidation to pre-
vent several Negroes from making or carrying out contracts of
labor. The federal legislation under which the defendants had
been tried was held to be invalid as applied to the facts of the
case: it could not be justified by the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments since they are restrictive upon only state action, nor
by the thirteenth since the acts complained of did not operate io
reduce the individuals to a condition of slavery. It was main-
tained that the protection of the rights violated was within the
jurisdiction of the states. After all, Congress had not made the
Negroes wards of the nation, but rather gave them citizenship
"doubtless believing that thereby in the long run their best in-
terests would be subserved, they taking their chance with other
citizens in the States where they should make their homes."'5
Justice Harlan, with whom Justice Day concurred, dissented on
the ground that the majority had given an entirely too narrow
construction to the thirteenth amendment. The disability to make
valid contracts for one's services was an inseparable incident of
the institution of slavery, and by reason of the amendment Con-
gress had the power not only to prevent the establishment of
slavery, pure and simple, but also to "make it impossible that any
of its incidents or badges exist." 1'53 The Great Dissenter also re-
affirmed the stand he had taken in the Civil Rights Cases concern-
149 Id. at 222.150 Id. at 223.
151203 U.S. 1 (1906).
152 Id. at 20.
153 Id. at 27.
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ing the fourteenth amendment's applicability to the acts of in-
dividuals.
Bailey v. Alabama5 4 came before the Court for the first time
in 1908. It was obvious that the Alabama legislature had estab-
lished what amounted to nothing more than a system of peonage,
but Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, refused to consider
the constitutional issue, even though it had been raised in the
state court, and denied relief to the oppressed Negro on the basis
of a technical procedural nicety-the petitioner was before the
Court prematurely; he was attempting to take a "shortcut" in
seeking to be discharged from custody in advance of his trial.
(It may be noted that even when the case came up to the high
court for the second time in 1911151 Holmes dissented from
Hughes' majority opinion which held the Alabama scheme un-
constitutional as violative of the thirteenth amendment. This was
certainly carrying the "states-as-experimental-stations" theory a
long wayl) Justice Harlan, again joined by Justice Day, admitted
that it might have been deemed a "shortcut" if the defendant had
sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court. But the Ala-
bama Supreme Court "recognized the proceeding by habeas
corpus to be in accordance with the local law," 50 never intimated
that the accused was taking any "shortcut" and by its final order
passed upon the constitutionality of the state statute. The Great
Dissenter thought it to be "a curious condition of things" if the
United States Supreme Court "must remain silent when the ques-
tion comes before it regularly, whether the final judgment of the
high court of a State does not deprive the citizen of rights secured
to him by the Supreme Law of the Land."157
That John Marshall Harlan was unalterably opposed to slavery
in any form whatsoever is clearly shown by his dissent in Robert-
son v. Baldwin.158 The majority of the Court upheld the power
of Congress to vest judicial power in state courts to compel sea-
men to carry out the contractual provisions contained in their
shipping articles. Stressing the point that historically the contract
of a sailor has always been treated as an exceptional one involving
254 211 U.S. 452 (1908).
155 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
156211 U.S. 452, 457 (1908).
157 Id. at 459.
158 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
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to a certain extent the surrender of personal liberty, Mr. Justice
Brown concluded that the thirteenth amendment was never in-
tended to apply to such a contract. Harlan in a opinion that has
been described as "bristling with a spirit of the rights of human
beings"159 contended that slavery exists "wherever the law recog-
nizes a right of property in a human being,"160 and that the "con-
dition of one who contracts to render personal services in connec-
tion with the private business of another becomes a condition of
involuntary servitude from the moment he is compelled against
his will to continue in such service."' 6 Drawing a clear distinc-
tion between the public duties of sailors who serve in the United
States Navy and those of seamen engaged in purely private busi-
ness, he maintained that the "placing of a person, by force, on a
vessel about to sail, is putting him in a condition of involuntary
servitude, if the purpose is to compel him against his will to give
his personal services in the private business in which that vessel
is engaged." 62 The argument that "the statute in question is
sanctioned by long usage among the Nations of the earth" did not
impress Justice Harlan one bit, for "these enactments of ancient
times" were "enforced by or under governments possessing arbi-
trary power inconsistent with a state of freedom."1 63 The past or
present practices of other governments, even those of England,
were of no consequence. In fact, pre-thirteenth amendment
American practices were not controlling, for although "prior to
the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment the arrest of a sea-
man and his forcible return under any circumstances to the vessel
on which he was engaged to serve could have been authorized
by an Act of Congress, such deprivation of the liberty of a free-
man cannot be justified under the Constitution as it now is."164
In conclusion Harlan remarked with some sarcasm that under the
Court's view of the Constitution "we may now look for advertise-
ments, not for runaway servants as in the days of slavery, but for
runaway seamen,"' 65 and he added with eloquent vigor: "In for-
159 Knight, "The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Harlan," 51 Amer. L. Rev.
481, 501 (1917).
160 165 U.S. 275, 292 (1897).
161 Id. at 301.
12 Id. at 292.
163 Id. at 293, 294.
164 Id. at 299.
165 Id. at 303.
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mer days, overseers could stand with whip in hand over slaves,
and force them to perform personal service for their masters.
While, with the assent of all, that condition of things has ceased
to exist, we can but be reminded of the past when it is adjudged
to be consistent with the law of the land for freemen who happen
to be seamen to be held in custody that they may be forced to
go aboard private vessels and render personal services against
their will." 6
It is significant that the reasoning and sentiments expresed by
John Marshall Harlan in his Baldwin v. Robertson dissent were
in large part embodied in the Seamen's Act of 1914.
F. Imperialism and the Insular Cases: Does the Constitution
Follow the Flag?
With the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines as a
result of the Spanish-American War the cry of "Imperialism"
was heard in the United States. The war and its aftermath gave
the politicians issues to talk about and made business for the
Supreme Court, too. Beginning in 1899 came the prize cases in-
volving important points of international law'0 7 and a series of
taxation cases. 18 Then from 1901 to 1905 came what have since
become known as the Insular Cases,0 9 which presented the ques-
tion whether the newly acquired territories were to be considered
subjugated colonies or integral parts of the United States. What
was their constitutional status? Did the Constitution apply to
them?
At this time President McKinley nominated to important
posts in Puerto Rico the sons of Justices Harlan and McKenna.
Gustavus Myers has pointed out that "this fact led to biting com-
ments by Senators Pettigrew, Teller and Butler on the subverting
of the 'independence of the judiciary'; the appointments, they
declared, singularly coincided with the fact that the question of
the status of the colonies was before the Supreme Court at that
precise time.'7 Myers continues: "The general effect of the
166 Ibid.
167 See cases cited in 2 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History
707 (1928).
168 See cases cited in 2 Warren, op. cit. supra, note 167, at 711.
169 See cases and law review articles cited in 2 Warren, op. cit. supra, note
167, at 708. See also The Insular Cases Comprising the Records, Briefs and Argu-
ments of Counsel . . . (compiled by Albert H. Howe) (1901).
170 Myers, History of the Supreme Court 647 (1925).
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various associated decisions was certainly in line with that desired
by McKinley and the capitalist groups behind him. 'The Con-
stitution did not follow the flag,' the Supreme Court decided,
thereby reducing the insular conquests to mere appendages." 17
1
This may have been so, but it is neither true nor fair to imply
that Harlan was in any way influenced to decide in favor of
administration policies, for his answer to the question presented
by the Insular Cases was, as we shall see, a most emphatic "The
Constitution does follow the flag!"
Boudin in his Government by judiciary'2 has made an acute
and penetrating analysis of the positions taken by the various
Justices in the Insular Cases. Here we shall center our attention
on the opinions of justice Harlan. But first, a summary of the
leading holdings of the Court. The DeLima and Downes cases1 73
were both five-to-four decisions: four of the DeLima majority be-
came the Downes dissenters, with Mr. Justice Brown serving as
the "swing-man."174 In the first case it was determined that Puerto
Rico had ceased to be a "foreign country" and that goods im-
ported from the island before the passage of the Foraker Act
could not be subjected to duties under the Dingley Tariff Act.
But the Court decided in the second case that even though
Puerto Rico had ceased to be a foreign territory, it did not be-
come part of the United States within the meaning of the con-
stitutional provisions concerning duties; hence, Congress could
lay duties upon imports from the island at any rate it chose-the
Foraker Act was constitutional. Then the Court held that the
Constitution of its own force-without legislation-did not carry
the right of trial by jury to the unincorporated Philippines,7 5 but
that it did to the incorporated territory of Alaska.17 6 Finally, in
the words of Charles Warren, the "capsheaf of the doctrine of
incorporation was applied in Puerto Rico v. Tapia, in 1918,177
when the Court held that rights guaranteed by the Constitution
171 Id. at 648.
172 2 Boudin, Government by Judiciary, ch. XXVIII (1932).
173 DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901).
174 The majority in the DeLima case consisted of Chief Justice Fuller and
Justices Harlan, White, Peckham and Brown, while in the Downes case Brown
joined Justices Gray, Brewer, Shiras and McKenna to form the majority.
176 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
170 Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
177245 U.S. 639 (1918).
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might be withheld by Congress from an unincorporated territory
even though Congress had granted United States citizenship to
the inhabitants of such territory."178
Now for Harlan's views on the Insular Cases and the question
of imperialism. It was inconceivable to this civil liberties cham-
pion that Congress could govern any territory of the United States
as a subjected colony. According to the Great Dissenter, the pro-
visions of the Constitution in their plenitude were equally as ap-
plicable to the possessions of the United States as to the mainland
territories. In his dissenting Downes opinion he maintained that
the "Constitution is supreme over every part of territory, wherever
situated, under the jurisdiction of the United States, and its full
operation cannot be stayed by any branch of the Government in
order to meet what some may suppose to be extraordinary emer-
gencies. If the Constitution is in force in any territory, it is in force
there for every purpose embraced by the objects for which the
Government was ordained."1 9 He could not admit that the mean-
ing of the Constitution depends upon "accidental circumstances"
nor would he grant that we may "violate the Constitution in
order to serve particular interests in our own or in foreign
lands."180 He has a ready reply for the imperialists: "We heard
much in argument about the 'expanding future of our country.'
It was said that the United States is to become what is called a
'world power;' and that if this Government intends to keep
abreast of the times and be equal to the great destiny that awaits
the American people, it must be allowed to exert all the power
that other nations are accustomed to exercise. My answer is, that
the fathers never intended that the authority and influence of the
nation should be extended otherwise than in accordance with the
Constitution."' 8 ' As for Mr. Justice (soon to be Chief Justice)
White's theory of incorporation, Harlan was constrained to say
that this idea of "incorporation' has some occult meaning which
my mind does not apprehend. It is enveloped in some mystery
which I am unable to unravel." 82
In Hawaii v. Manicki38 the defendant had been convicted
178 2 Warren, op. cit. supra, note 167, at 711.
179 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 885 (1901).
180 Ibid.
181 Id. at 386.
182 Id. at 391.
183 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
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of manslaughter by a verdict of nine of the twelve jurors in ac-
cordance with local law. By a five-to-four decision the Court
upheld the conviction since, it was reasoned, Congress had not
intended by its annexation resolution to extend all the constitu-
tional rights and privileges to the islands. Justice Harlan, while
agreeing in dissent with Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer
and Peckham that "by the specific language" of the annexation
resolution "no legislation which was contrary to the Constitution
of the United States remained in force,"8 4 went on to contend,
as might be expected, that the issue could not rightly be ap-
proached from the viewpoint of Congressional intent. In his
opinion, "the Constitution of the United States became the su-
preme law of Hawaii immediately upon the acquisition by the
United States of complete sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands,
and without any act of Congress formally extending the Con-
stitution to the Islands. It then became controlling, beyond the
power of Congress to prevent."18 5 He felt that he "could not
otherwise hold without conceding the power of Congress, the
creature of the Constitution, by mere non-action, to withhold vital
constitutional guaranties, from the inhabitants of a territory gov-
erned by the authority, and only by the authority, of the United
States." 86
In the course of his Mankicki dissent Justice Harlan wrote that
he stood by "the doctrine that the Constitution is the supreme
law in every territory, as soon as it comes under the sovereign
dominion of the United States for purposes of civil administration,
and whose inhabitants are under its entire authority and jurisdic-
tion."'87 And it was this view to which he consistently and
courageously adhered in all the Insular Cases and that he ex-
pressed in his concurring opinion in Rassmussen v. United
States 8 and in his dissents in the Donr89 and Trono10 cases. He
fought a losing battle, though, for it was Chief Justice White's
theory of incorporation that eventually prevailed as the Court's
doctrine. It is reported that White later expressed his strong
184 Id. at 223.
185 Id. at 238.
186 Id. at 240.
187 Ibid.
188 197 U.S. 516, 528 (1904).
189 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904).
190 Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 535 (1905).
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feelings on the imperialism issue by exclaiming: "Why, sir, if we
had not decided as we did, this country would have been less
than a Nation." 9 The concern of John Marshall Harlan, how-
ever, had been not with national pride and power, but rather
with the dignity of man and the protection of civil liberties.
IV. Conclusion-The Court and the Constitution
A student and disciple of the Great Chief Justice in whose
honor he was named, John Marshall Harlan was a staunch, un-
swerving federalist. When the Centennial Celebration of the
Organization of the Federal Judiciary was held in New York on
February 4, 1890, he was on hand to reply to the toast "The
Supreme Court of the United States," and he spelled out what
he considered to be the "vital principles" enunciated by the high
court on the subject of federalism:
That while the preservation of the States, with
authority to deal with matters not committed to national
control, is fundamental in the American Constitutional sys-
tem, the Union cannot exist without a government of the
whole;
That the Constitution of the United States was made
for the whole people of the Union, and is equally binding
upon all the courts and all the citizens;
That the general government, though limited as to its
objects, is yet supreme with respect to those objects, is the
government of all, its powers are delegated by all, it repre-
sents all, and acts for all; and,
That America has chosen to be, in many respects and to
many purposes, a nation, and for all these purposes her gov-
ernment is complete, to all these objects it is competent. 9 2
Upon the occasion of his lecturing at the Union College of Law
in 1892 the Chicago Legal News had this to say of Justice Harlan:
He is a great admirer of the organic law, but believes in a
construction of it for the whole people, while he discards
the doctrine of "State Sovereignty" as dangerous and in-
iquitous.193
191 As quoted in John W. Davis, "Edward Douglas White," 7 A.B.A.J. 377,
379 (1921).
192 Address of Mr. Justice Harlan, Centennial Celebration of the Organization
of the Federal Judiciary, 134 U.S. 751, 755 (1890).
193 "Judge Harlan's Lectures," 24 Chi. Legal News 325 (1892).
[Vol. 46,
HmLAN AND TE CONSTITUTION
Nine years later in his dissenting Downes opinion' 94 Harlan him-
self wrote: "Although the States are constituent parts of the
United States, the Government rests upon the authority of the
people of the United States, and not on that of the States." 9 "-
He went on to endorse warmly Webster's concept of an estab-
lished-by-the-people-of-the-United-States Constitution and to re-
ject emphatically a constitutional system founded upon a states-
in-union or compact-of-states federal structure.'96
Judicial legislation in any shape, degree, manner or form was
abhorrent to Justice Harlan, and it is interesting to note that his
first and last dissenting opinions were devoted to execrating
what to his mind was the most dreadful of the capital judicial
sins.1' 7 He concluded his Standard Oil dissent with what "may
almost be looked upon as parting words from a great judge to his
country: "108
After many years of public service at the national capital
and after a somewhat close observation of the conduct of
public affairs, I am impelled to say that there is abroad in
our land a most harmful tendency to bring about the amend-
ing of constitutions and legislative enactments by means
alone of judicial construction. As a public policy has been
declared by the legislative department in respect of inter-
state commerce, over which Congress has entire control,
under the Constitution, all concerned must patiently submit
to what has been lawfully done, until the people of the
United States-the source of all national power-shall, in
their own time, upon reflection and through the legislative
department of the government, require a change of that
policy. ... The supreme law of the land, which is binding
alike upon all,-upon Presidents, Congresses, the courts and
the people,-gives to Congress, and to Congress alone,
authority to regulate interstate commerce, and when Con-
gress forbids any restraints of such commerce, in any form,
all must obey its mandate. To overreach the action of Con-
gress merely by judicial construction, that is, by indirection,
is a blow at the integrity of our governmental system, and
in the end will prove most dangerous to all.19
104 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 375 (1901). See p. 442 supra.
195 Id. at 377.106 See id. at 377-378.197 See United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37 (1877), Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911). See also cases cited in note 141 supra.
198 Clark, Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Harlan 201 (1915).
199 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 105 (1911).
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Yet in the course of his lectures on Constitutional law at George
Washington University Harlan frankly confided to his students:
"I want to say to you young gentlemen that if we don't like an act
of Congress, we don't have much trouble to find grounds to de-
clare it unconstitutional."2 0
Justice Harlan was wont to refer to himself as a strict con-
structionist, but he might more accurately be termed a liberal
one. Although he revered the Constitution and the Founding
Fathers, it seems likely that had he been on the Court during the
'thirties, he would have been inclined to attribute to the Fathers
both the wisdom of having neither desired nor intended to rule
future generations from the grave and also the foresight to have
realized that with changing social and economic conditions, con-
stitutional provisions should and would be given new and ex-
panded meanings. It is arguable that he would have subscribed
to the theory that our basic legal document is a living one-a
growing, changing, fruitful one; that "We, the People" were not
merely the citizens of the 18th century, but are the citizens of
each succeeding generation.
Never a casuist, Harlan had little use for semantic-gymnastics,
argumentation or any intellectual exercise contrived as a vain dis-
play of learning. Perhaps he did lack an acute power of analysis-
it is this alone that might keep him from being named on the
roster of the all-time-great Justices-but his direct, incisive logic,
sound common sense, simple, rugged realism and especially his
penchant for independent thinking made him a courageous liberal
dissenter second to none. Chief Justice White rather ponderously,
but quite accurately described the motivating force of Harlan's
entire judicial career as being the "purpose to do justice as it was
given him to see it, a justice not resting upon mere metaphysical
conceptions or distinctions of casuistry concerning the lines of
separation between right and wrong, but a justice based upon
what seemed to him to be a common sense of justice, begetting
an ever-present and vivid purpose to uphold the right and to
frustrate the wrong, and ever to see to it that the weak were not
mastered by the strong."20"
Of one thing we can be sure: Justice Harlan never hesitated
200 As quoted in Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 88 (1941).
201 Proceedings on the Death of Mr. Justice Harlan, 222 U.S. xxvi (1911).
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to speak out courageously and eloquently against every infringe-
ment of civil liberties-the preservation of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, as he read that document, was
his constant concern. He was for his time Justices Black-Douglas-
Murphy-Rutledge all-in-onel On occasions even Holmes would
not go as far as his "brilliant precursor in liberalism and dis-
sent."2 °2 Often John Marshall Harlan stood alone; but he always
stood firmly and proudly as the stalwart judicial champion of the
dignity of man and the protector of human rights.
202 Rodell, Nine Men 148 (1955).
